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Abstract
The desire to feel clean and pure might not merely be the absence of contamination and resulting feelings of disgust. Instead, it 
might have a social function because early in evolution social grooming not only involved improved personal hygiene and cleanliness, 
but also increased group cohesion. Thus, knowing that one’s body is clean, proper and tidy might have social implications that go 
beyond morality. 
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Being a good person appears to involve more than treating others 
fairly, and ensuring that no one is harmed. Whereas early work 
on morality primarily focused on concerns of harm and fairness 
(e.g., Turiel, 1983), more recent considerations propose five (or 
possibly more) moral concerns (Graham, Haidt, & Nosek, 2009; 
Haidt & Joseph, 2007). In addition to ensuring fairness and pre-
venting harm to others, individuals attempt to protect the rights 
of their own ingroup, and appreciate and maintain hierarchical 
order within society. Further, individuals try to protect the purity 
of their body and spirit by avoiding physical contamination. 
Among the five foundations that have been identified so far, 
purity stands out as the only one that does not appear to have a 
clearly social function. Purity and cleanliness have been concep-
tualized as the absence of all things dirty, disgusting, and poten-
tially morally wrong. However, I will argue that rather than 
constituting the mere absence of disgust, wanting to be clean 
represents a fundamental human desire. Based on comparative 
evidence from primates and other nonhuman animals, an evolved 
reason for this might be that the desire to be clean facilitates 
affiliating with others in the process of shared-grooming activi-
ties. Although in humans much of the need for such social 
grooming has been replaced by the invention of language 
(Dunbar, 1993), the desire to be clean, proper and tidy remains.
Whereas treating others fairly, being loyal to one’s group, 
respecting authority et cetera, all can be considered adaptive in 
promoting group cohesion, no such social function is apparent 
for the purity dimension. In contrast, purity is only concerned 
with the self (Haidt & Joseph, 2007) and constitutes a moral 
intuition that evolved from the general need to physically safe-
guard one’s own body from contaminants and pathogens that 
are spread by physical contact (Schaller & Duncan, 2007). 
Disgust initially evolved as an emotion to protect the body from 
physical harm, but was extended to social and moral domains, 
such that immoral deeds are also considered disgusting (Rozin, 
Haidt, & McCauley, 2008). Indeed, the boundaries between 
physical and moral disgust can be blurred, and people some-
times misinterpret one for the other: when induced to feel 
physical disgust, people often make more severe moral judg-
ments (Schnall, Haidt, Clore, & Jordan, 2008; Wheatley & 
Haidt, 2005), and, for example, people who are prone to expe-
riencing disgust are more likely to condemn the concept of 
homosexuality (Inbar, Pizarro, Knobe, & Bloom, 2009).
On the flip side of disgust, support for the moral intuition of 
purity has come from recent findings involving physical purity 
and its relationship with morality. For example, after being 
reminded of immoral deeds they had committed in the past, 
participants showed a greater desire to physically clean them-
selves (Zhong & Liljenquist, 2006). Such cleansing desires are 
modality specific, such that after having orally said something 
bad people want to use mouthwash, but after having manually 
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typed something bad people want to use a hand sanitizer (Lee 
& Schwarz, 2010a). Further, being primed with cleanliness 
concepts or engaging in hand washing can change people’s 
moral judgments, and make moral judgments less severe when 
cleanliness is attributed to the transgressions under considera-
tions (Schnall, Benton, & Harvey, 2008), but more severe when 
the cleanliness is attributed to the self (Zhong, Strejcek, & 
Sivanathan, 2010). The sense that being clean is fundamentally 
good might explain why a clean smell in a room, such as a whiff 
of Windex, can increase prosocial behavior (Liljenquist, Zhong, 
& Galinsky, 2010). Further, recent findings suggest that the 
effects of cleansing behavior go beyond the moral domain, and, 
for example, reduce the regret that would otherwise accompany 
difficult decisions (Lee & Schwarz, 2010b).
All this evidence suggests that the sense of being clean, 
proper and tidy constitutes a critical desire, or even a human 
need. Might cleanliness be more than the simple absence of 
contamination? If so, what function beyond the avoidance of 
disgusting substances might the desire for cleanliness serve? 
One possibility is that human and nonhuman animals alike 
have a desire to keep clean and tidy because this desire makes 
possible a critical process within groups: social grooming. 
Picking out insects, leaves or other impurities from another 
individual’s skin or fur is a very common activity among pri-
mates and other animals (Dunbar, 1996). Primates spend up to 
20% of their time grooming others (Dunbar, 1993), and this 
activity is considered fundamental for group cohesion. It is 
curious that animals would spend so much time in an activity 
that requires getting very close to another individual and thus 
involves being vulnerable. In contrast to disgust, which is an 
avoidance-based emotion, the desire to feel clean in its most 
basic form therefore involves approach and getting close to 
other conspecifics.
Importantly, grooming not only improves personal hygiene 
but serves as an important social glue among group members. 
Grooming is a dyadic activity that occurs selectively among 
some members of a group who form a primary network of 
friendships, and who are then more likely to help each other. In 
fact, time spent helping others in the friendship network is a 
direct function of time spent grooming (Seyfarth & Cheney, 
1984), and males who are in grooming relationships are less 
likely to compete over access to females (Dunbar, 1983). 
Grooming relationships appear to be inherently pleasant, as 
indicated by increased brain opioid levels in primates after 
grooming sessions (Keverne, Martensz, & Tuite, 1989).
Of course, among present-day humans, social-grooming 
processes are not exactly common. Dunbar (1993, 1996) notes 
that because of increasing group sizes it became increasingly 
impractical for human beings to service their social relation-
ships by grooming, but instead, more efficient grooming strate-
gies had to be developed. Based on this logic, Dunbar argues 
that language grew out of the need to groom, but whereas 
grooming was confined to two individuals, language had the 
capacity to enable bonding processes among several individuals. 
And yet, as suggested by the evidence cited above, although the 
need to engage in physical grooming in social contexts 
 vanished, the need to have a clean and proper body appears 
inherently desirable.
Some preliminary evidence suggests that people approve of 
others’ cleansing-related activities. We recently demonstrated 
that when considering morally positive and negative behaviors 
people spontaneously show facial activity that is specific to 
certain moral domains (Cannon, Schnall, & White, in press). 
When considering transgressions within the purity domain, 
activity was greatest for the levator labii muscle involved in a 
disgust expression, with additional increased activity for the 
corrugator supercilii muscle involved in frowning. Unexpectedly, 
corrugator activity was significantly reduced when participants 
considered positive statements within the purity domain (e.g., 
somebody brushed their teeth after every meal), thus suggesting 
a reduction in negative affect. Further studies will need to 
explore the extent to which cleanliness is considered praiseworthy, 
and whether this might be especially important within social 
contexts.
In conclusion, the need for cleanliness might not so much 
reflect the need for godliness and the desire to reach out for 
the higher spiritual beings above us, but instead, for getting 
closer to those next to us in the process of sharing our own 
vulnerabilities.
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